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  • 29.10.2006

    Projects and uncertainty, hopes and fears

    1) Projects have a time structure. One way of putting this would be to point out that projects start at some time, are carried out over a certain period of time, and end at some later time than they began. (In some cases projects have no definite end but 'fade out': activities that make up the project are de-intensified, perhaps, or otherwise thinned out, until there is nothing recognizable left of what was once a project.)

    While these are characteristics that projects share with other processes, there are also some more specific ones: projects often spring from the formulation of a goal, or they are motivated by one or more desires. Goals and desires have a time structure of their own, which influences that of the project. For example, connected to a desire is usually an imagined future situation in which the desire is fulfilled. Formulating a goal means, similarly, to specify (more or less explicitly) a future state of affairs that is to be brought about. Thus devising a project involves, at the beginning, some future-pointing elements.

    Moreover, the activities that unfold during the pursuit of a project have, as reference points, various similar forward-pointing elements. These can be intermediate goals, or experimental paths that are followed for a while, or perhaps deliberate delays (wait for things to develop further before taking action). There are also backwards-pointing time-structured elements that play a role in projects: elements of review, or regret, which might trigger course corrections.

    These time-structured elements make up the background of an ongoing process. The structure is not purely temporal, though. The steps that have to be taken as an ordered sequence of moves, where each of them is dependent on some of the preceding ones, can be described without reference to the time structure itself. Here is an analogy: think of the opening of a game of chess. Although in chess tournaments an amount of time is allocated for a given number of moves that a player can make (and it might have a real impact on a player if that time is running out), there is nothing in the moves a such that has a temporal structure. They could be written down and replayed in order, but not necessarily with the same time intervals between them as when they were originally played.

    In fact, the structure of projects might include such elements that imply an ordering only (some intermediate goals must first be reached for further project stages to begin), whereas others included in it have a temporal (that is, a durational) aspect in addition to that. What makes elements in the structure of projects temporal is that a certain amount of time will necessarily flow by for each step or stage in the project. Sometimes this will be in the trivial sense that a minimal execution time of each step has to be considered, but there are many situations in which this aspect becomes much more interesting. Take, for example, the psychological impact that a forced delay may have on an agent ('Never let the strain of inaction alone be your stimulus to action' is a well stated advice that a character in Reginald Hill's novel Arms and the Women gives.) Or consider situations in which the passing by of a certain time is itself part of the plan (having planted a tree, you have to give it some time to grow before you can expect to be able to bring in the first fruits that grew on it).

    2) A substantial uncertainty is introduced into each project that is subject to this sort of time structure. It comes from the multiplication of possible developments that might take place concurrently. Note that this is not specific to idle times during the project. (There is no difference between a garden that transforms into a wilderness because you're just waiting to see what happens, and one that you leave to itself because you have other and more important things to do.) It is not only that these developments may take place and introduce surprising new facts - since the duration in question cannot be known in advance, it is also often difficult to estimate how many of these intermediate developments can occur, and what their impact will be.

    And there are other sources of uncertainty, of course: the outcome of steps (actions) that are taken during the course of a project is not always completely controllable; one might also make mistakes, both in the assessment of the situation and in the execution of the steps which make up the project.

    The uncertainty that springs from the latter sort of sources results from an imperfection in the agent's cognitive capacities, which may still leave room for improvement; however, if it is the impact of concurrent developments or other uncontrollable events that makes the actual course and the outcome of a project uncertain, then the uncertainty may well be an inevitable ingredient in all projects.

    3) The last point needs closer examination. Arguably, since we all are not perfect and do make mistakes in judging the situation and in performing the steps in our projects (or have bad timing etc.), all our projects include necessarily an element of chance. If this were the only source of uncertainty, however, then that element of chance would be nothing but a result of our imperfection, and it could be imagined that, at least for certain projects (say, routine projects under safe conditions), and perhaps with a certain training given to the participating agents, this uncertainty could be reduced to a negligible minimum. Actually, there is a very common paradigm for exactly this: automation, that is, the use of programmable machines for executing pre-defined sequences of steps. Given that they operate in environments stable enough not to endanger their functioning, they carry out tasks very reliably.

    The sort of tasks that can be carried out by machines resembles in some respects the projects under discussion here. This applies even more so if they include elements of error-correction and self-programming, which enables them, to a certain degree, to react to deviations from the program. Still, in general the outline of the sequence of steps is designed by humans, not by the machines, and this is also where the purposiveness is imported.

    Nevertheless, if we assume that the developments sketched in the two previous paragraphs converge (i.e., on the one hand, the introduction of safe conditions and training for agents, which reduces imperfection in them and thus reduces uncertainty; and on the other hand, the development of self- correcting and self-controlling machines, which may at some point in the future be able to autonomously plan the sequences of their tasks themselves, given some general goals and guidelines, and thus resemble human agents and their projects), then we may think of uncertainties introduced by imperfection in cognition and execution as reducible and perhaps negligible in future times. However, as I pointed out at the end of section 2), there is another sort of uncertainty that seems more constitutive for the specific human projects under discussion.

    The difference is that the latter sort of uncertainty springs from steps with uncontrollable outcome that are taken in a project - sometimes due to lack of more controllable alternatives, sometimes deliberately in spite of, or perhaps because of, the risk involved. Similarly, the uncertainty may be the result of the fact that the course of the project includes periods that allow for concurrent developments that could have an impact on the goals and possibilities that make up the project - and that may again be something unavoidable or something that the agent considers as a bet he wants to make. There is no equivalent here to the possibility of correction as in the cases of uncertainty described above.

    (Of course there may be projects in which this particular type of uncertainty plays no role - the agent may find a sequence of controllable steps at his disposal, and thus be able to avoid it. But this applies surely not to all possible projects, and very probably only to a very small portion of those which are actually carried out by agents in our world.)

    It would be an interesting question how important uncertainty of this sort is for our ability to formulate and carry out projects. Is it constitutive (i.e. would there be no projects if this sort of uncertainty would not occur)? Could we imagine an ideal world where there is none of this uncertainty and still people work out and execute something that we could recognize as projects in the sense discussed here? Note that this is not precluded just by the fact that this uncertainty is not part in all projects (as remarked in the previous, parenthesized, paragraph).

    4) Hopes and fears are emotions that can result from that sort of uncertainty in one's projects.[1] The uncertainty discussed here is uncertainty in advance about the project's success and the actual course that it will take when carried out - not the feeling of being uncertain, or undecided, about what to do in a given situation. Hoping that certain events will take place and that projects will have a certain desired outcome implies that there is such an uncertainty (if one were certain of a given outcome, one could still be looking forward to it, but this would not be the specific emotion of hope). Similarly, fearing certain unfavourable outcomes requires that these outcomes are thought to be likely, or at least possible. Even if one knew for sure that a certain undesired event will occur, one may still fear the moment when this happens. But plainly this would not be fear because of an uncertainty. On the other hand, if it would be regarded as impossible to occur, then if fear was felt it would be certainly not fearing this event. (Consider: 'I am already at the station and it is practically impossible to miss the train now. Still I'm afraid I will not make it.' - This is irrational; if this sort of anxiety were felt by someone, we would suspect some pathological constellation of his subconscious and think that it is only overtly, and probably misleadingly, about the train.)

    Emotions in general have a structure that includes an element of belief (emotions are about something that, crucially, one has to believe to be the case) and an element of valuation (one must think that what the emotion is about has a certain positive or negative value for oneself).[2] Hopes and fears that are generated by uncertainty in projects, in the sense described above, seem to share the element of belief, and to differ mainly in the dimension of valuation: hoping means to assign positive values to possible future situations during the course of the project, whereas fears involve putting negative values on them. Their magnitude increases with the significance that the project is seen to have (it is all the higher the larger or more important the projects in question are for the agent), and probably also with the importance of the steps themselves - if failure to perform a given move successfully would be fatal for a project, its significance will be generally much higher than that of moves that allow for a 'Plan B', or that of such moves which might be tried again.

    Let us turn to the element of belief mentioned above. The beliefs in question here are about (possible) future situations. They are identical with those that the agent forms to plot her moves in the project. For some steps which he considers an agent will take the outcome as relatively certain, and base a good deal of her plans on these assumptions. The outcomes of other steps are uncertain, and (as pointed out above), sometimes it is even uncertain which events may happen concurrently that affect the project - the concurrency being due to idle times or waiting periods that delay the progress of the project while developments in the surrounding world go on. Having these possibilities in view generates hopes and fears (depending on whether they affect the project in positive or negative directions) - but this is not something that an agent can possibly avoid. Not considering the possibilities at all would severely limit the capacity to form projects, or would at any rate block the imaginative access to a high number of possible courses that it would be advisable to consider. Considering them but regarding them (incorrectly) as more certain than they are would amount to delusion, and though it would eliminate the emotionality (and thus probably remove unpleasant feelings, at least in the case of fears, and in that of unfulfilled hopes), it would severely affect the success rate of projects in general.

    It should be concluded that minimally the hopes and fears that result from the discussed type of uncertainty are an inevitable ingredient in lives that are structured by projects. If there is any motivational import from these projects, then it will be taken up by the valuations that partly constitute hopes and fears concerning intermediate situations in the course of the project. Short of reducing that motivational import, then, there is no way to eliminate these emotions without unreasonably limiting the capacity to form hypothetical beliefs, which are necessary to devise and carry out projects at all.

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    [1] The discussion here does not cover all uses of 'hope' and 'fear'. For a helpful survey see Aaron Ben Ze'ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, Cambridge: MIT Press 2000, esp. 473-489.

    [2] See Robert Nozick, The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations, New York: Touchstone 1989, esp. 87-95, and the bibliographical hints given there.


 

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