21.9.2008
I'm currently reading Margaret Graver's excellent edition of the
third and fourth book of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations[1]. (So
this isn't really a review, since I haven't even finished the book; but
I've got a few things to say already.)
The title of the book is Cicero on the emotions, and it contains
the two parts of the Tusculan Disputations relevant for that topic:
the 3rd book, "On grief", and the 4th, "On emotions" in general. In
addition to the translation itself, there is an extensive commentary and
a helpful introduction (all by Graver). Four appendices supply further
material on Cicero's sources.
1) The introduction includes what I think is the best five-page
introduction to Stoic philosophy I've found so far (xix-xxiii). Graver first
distinguishes between two senses of 'rational', a descriptive sense (where
doing something is rational if there is some thought behind it) and a
normative sense (where something is taken as rational only if it is the right
and approriate thing to do). In the descriptive sense, thoughts and actions
in humans are rational insofar they exercise those mental capacities
paradigmatically found in language use. Any rational action (even those under
the influence of strong emotions) has a propositional core; an action can be
taken as a practical commitment to a proposition in a way similar to taking
a belief as a commitment to a proposition.
Having explained this connection between actions, beliefs and propositions
in the descriptive sense of rationality, Graver shows how in Stoic
philosophy a normative sense is constructed out of this. If we look at
our actions and beliefs, do they always cohere with each other, and are we
ourselves aware of the degree of coherence and consistence in them? Imagine
someone who would achieve to make all her beliefs and actions to be
coherent and consistent, to bring them all into a perfect, orderly system.
Such a person (who would be called virtuous according to Stoic philosophy)
is the measuring rod for how rational a belief or action is in the normative
sense: it is the right thing to think or to do if a fully virtuous person
would think or do so.
2) From this starting point, it is easy to see why following
virtue, in Stoic philosophy, is equated with leading the life that is
most natural for humans. (Given that the most characteristic thing about
humans is that mental capacity I mentioned above, namely to form beliefs
and take actions that are rational in the descriptive sense.)
Graver goes on to derive a more spectacular Stoic idea from this, namely
that emotions are not part of the best possible human life. She also
explains in what sense many typical goals that people have, goals such
as getting money or becoming famous, are seen as 'indifferent' in Stoic
theory. I won't re-tell the story here, of course: I encourage you to
go to a library or bookstory and fetch the book. (And besides - the parts
written by Cicero are also a good read in their own right ;-)
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[1] Cicero on the emotions. Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4.
Translated and with commentary by Margaret Graver. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 2002.
