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  • 12.10.2009

    Kafka's Trial: Ambiguity before the law (contd. again)

    (Continued from part 1 and part 2.)

    3) Where do we stand right now? I have traced two interpretational themes in the dialogue immediately surrounding 'Before the law': K. charges the doorkeeper of deceptive behavior, and he also thinks that the doorkeeper violates his duties. Both turn out to be misinterpretations: the first is promoted by the ambiguity in "Täuschung" and its cognates and by K.'s strong tendency to see himself as victim of malicious forces; the second by an ambiguity in the reading of the doorkeeper's behavior (granting some ephemeral hope, which is due to a character weakness, but interpreted by K. as conferring a right).

    Having failed to correct the first misunderstanding, the chaplain seems to be more successful in countering the second; at least he ascertains K.'s agreement regarding his analysis of the doorkeeper's character. He also relativizes K.'s opinion that the man from the country is deceived and thus in an antagonistic relationship towards the doorkeeper. That's some improvement, but not much: all this doesn't remove the wrong-headed idea that there is primarily a deception going on, and only shifts the antagonism to the world surrounding both the man from the country and the doorkeeper.

    The discussion in the dome with the chaplain reveals a deeper aspect of K.'s general attitude: he has a tendency to blame others (or at least, blame something), and so avoid taking responsibility for his own interactions with the world. Such interactions are generally of two kinds: perception and action. In perception we take in what goes on around us, and form opinions and beliefs. In action, we attempt to change our surroundings (actions in this general sense may be physical actions as well as verbal actions). Both actions and perceptions can fail or succeed: we can manage to get them more or less right; we can misperceive, an action may or may not fulfill its purpose, in some instances we may even completely miss something we should be aware of, or fail to act where we should have tried. How successful we are, however, depends not only on ourselves, but also at least partly on circumstances and factors outside us. Still, we are responsible for what we do and what we perceive — unless our actions are constrained or our perceptions mislead by malicious others, in which cases we may be excused.

    K.'s behavior, and his overall argumentation, aims at exculpating the actions and perceptions of the man from the country, thereby preempting or at least mitigating any judgment that might be taken on their correctness. Failure to perceive vital aspects of the situation (such as the fact that nobody ever asked for entrance at this particular door) are explained by reference to deception; failure to act (be it to grasp the nettle and enter when the doorkeeper offers it or simply walking away from an unpromising situation) is excused by the wrongly inflicted constraints resulting from the doorkeeper's supposed violation of his duty. In the background, to mention it once more, is K.'s tendency to strongly identify himself with the man from the country, a tendency that has sometimes seduced commentators to take the doorkeeper story as a parable standing for the whole novel; and certainly, if we take K.'s point of view, that precisely is an expression of the identification. In what follows, we'll have to see how thin the interpretational ice really is here, and how questionable a move it can be to simple assume K.'s point of view in these matters.


 

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